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Résumé / Abstract
Nous considérons les effets de différentes séquences de travail et de
repos sur la productivité quotidienne des travailleurs qui soccupent de plantation
darbres en Colombie-Britannique. Nous faisons une comparaison des profils
intertemporels de la productivité des planteurs qui sont payés à taux fixe avec celle
des planteurs qui sont payés à la pièce. Nos résultats suggèrent que les planteurs qui
sont payés à la pièce sont plus productifs que ceux qui sont payés un taux fixe.
Pourtant, la productivité des planteurs qui sont payés à la pièce diminue avec le
nombre de journées consécutives travaillées; la baisse de productivité est entre trois
et cinq pour cent par jour. Les travailleurs qui sont payés un taux fixe ne démontrent
aucune réduction de productivité.
We examine the effects of different sequences of work and rest on the
daily productivity of workers who planted trees in the province of British
Columbia, Canada, comparing the intertemporal productivity profiles of planters
who were paid either fixed wages or piece rates. We find that planters who are
paid piece rates produce more, on average, than those who are paid fixed wages,
but that the productivity of piece-rate planters falls with the number of
consecutive days worked; the fall in productivity is between three and five
percent per day. Fixed-wage planters, on the other hand, showed no such
decreases.
Mots Clés : Systèmes de compensation, productivité, repos, récupération
Keywords : Compensation Systems, Productivity, Rest, Recuperation
JEL : D2, J3, L2
1. Introduction and Motivation
Economists have long been interested in the eects that alternative pay-
ment schemes have on performance. Cheung (1969), who focussed on
risk sharing under two dierent payment schemes or contractual arrange-
ments in agriculture (viz., wage labor and sharecropping), is an early
example in this line of inquiry. Other examples in the modern con-
tract literature are surveyed by Hart and Holmstrom (1985) as well as
by Milgrom and Roberts (1992). In labor economics, authors such as
Lazear (1986,1995,1996), Blinder (1990), Brown (1990,1992), and Ehren-
berg (1990) as well as Paarsch and Shearer (1996) have focussed on two
common payment schemes for workers, xed wages and piece rates, as
important examples of contracts in personnel policy. Under xed wages,
the rm pays the worker a xed sum of money for each period of time
worked (e.g., $225 per day), while under piece rates the rm pays the
worker a xed sum of money for each task completed (e.g., $0.25 per tree
planted).
Most researchers in the economics and personnel literature have fo-
cussed on the notion that, with costly monitoring, workers will expend
more eort under piece-rate payment schemes than under xed-wage pay-
ment schemes. Therefore, piece rates are considered more economically
ecient than xed wages. In this paper, we examine the corollarial no-
tion that humans are not machines and that they tire. Thus, the amount
of eort that a worker expends in conjunction with the amount of rest
that that worker takes can aect the ability of his body to regenerate. To-
day's choices of eort and rest can aect tomorrow's productivity because
expending more eort today increases fatigue tomorrow.
To answer the question \What are the intertemporal eects on ef-
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fort and productivity when workers are paid either xed wages or piece
rates?", we develop a simple, intertemporal model of eort choices under
xed wages and piece rates. We then trace through the eects that these
eort choices have on fatigue and productivity, under dierent assump-
tions. Finally, we investigate empirically the eects of dierent sequences
of work and rest on the daily productivity of workers who were paid either
xed wages or piece rates for planting coniferous seedlings in the province
of British Columbia, Canada.
Tree planting is a simple task. It involves digging a hole with a special
shovel, placing a seedling in this hole, and then covering its roots with
soil, ensuring that the tree is upright and that the roots are fully covered.
While the task may be simple, it can be quite demanding physically.
For example, some planters have been known to expend 6,000 calories of
energy per day. Working this hard for one day and then resting is one
thing, but planters typically work ve to six consecutive days without rest
days. In some cases, planters have been known to work as many as eleven
consecutive days without rest days.
What toll do such sequences of planting and rest take on produc-
tivity, and how do the eects dier between xed-wage and piece-rate
payment schemes? The answers to these questions are not only of aca-
demic interest, but also of policy relevance in British Columbia where
some 170 to 200 million seedlings planted per year: small improvements
in personnel policy could result in large savings because of the enormous
scale of planting.
From the personnel and payroll records of a medium-sized, tree-
planting rm in the southeastern corner of British Columbia, we have
obtained daily production records for 51 individuals who were involved
in a total of 570 dierent work-and-rest cycles, 67 involving xed-wage
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planters and 503 involving piece-rate planters. In all, the data set contains
1,928 daily productivity observations, of which 223 concern planters paid
xed wages and 1,705 concern planters paid piece rates. We nd that
planters paid piece rates produce more, on average, per day than those
paid xed wages. We also nd that average daily production for piece-rate
planters falls at a rate between three and ve percent per day, while that
for xed-wage planters appears unaected by the number of consecutive
days worked. Even after ten or eleven consecutive days of work, however,
piece-rate planters produce more, on average, than xed-wage planters.
The paper is in ve more parts. In the next section, we describe
briey some institutional features of the tree-planting industry in British
Columbia, while in section 3, we develop a simple theoretical model which
highlights the intertemporal eects that the dierent payment schemes
have on eort, fatigue, and productivity. In section 4, we develop a mea-
surement equation that can be estimated using existing data and present
our empirical estimates of the eects of work and rest on productivity
under the dierent payment schemes. We conclude the paper in section
5, while in an appendix to the paper, we describe the creation of the data
set used.
2. Tree Planting in British Columbia
British Columbia produces around twenty-ve percent of the softwood
lumber in North America. To ensure a steady supply of timber, the
factor input necessary to produce this lumber, extensive reforestation
is undertaken by both the Minstry of Forests and the major timber-
harvesting rms who hold Tree Farm Licenses.
2
2
In British Columbia, nearly 90 percent of all timber is on government-
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The mechanics of this reforestation are relatively straightforward.
Prior to the harvest of any tract of coniferous timber, random samples
of cones are taken from the trees on the tract, and seedlings are grown
from the seeds contained in these cones. This practice ensures that the
seedlings to be replanted are compatible with the local microclimates and
soil as well as representative of the historical species composition. After
the tract has been harvested, the land is prepared for planting, often by
burning whatever slash timber remains and sometimes by \screeng" the
forest oor. Screeng involves removing the natural build-up of organic
matter on the forest oor so that the soil is exposed. Screeng makes
planting easier because seedlings cannot be planted in screef, the organic
material, but must be planted in soil.
Tree planting is a simple task. It involves digging a hole with a
special shovel, placing a seedling in this hole, and then covering its roots
with soil, ensuring that the tree is upright and that the roots are fully
covered with soil. The typical density of seedlings is about 1,800 stems
per hectare, or an inter-tree spacing of about 2.4 metres, although this
can vary substantially.
3
A typical work day begins at 7:00 a.m. and
ends around 5:00 p.m., with an hour for lunch as well as two or three 15
owned (Crown) land. The Crown, through the Ministry of Forests, sells
the right to harvest the timber on this land in two dierent ways. The
most common way is at administratively set prices to thirty-four rms
who hold Tree Farm Licenses. These licenses have been negotiated over
the last three-quarter century, and require that the licensee adopt specic
harvesting as well as reforestation plans. About 90 percent of all Crown
timber is harvested by rms holding Tree Farm Licenses. The second,
and less common way, to sell timber is at public auction through the
Small Business Forest Enterprise Program. In this case, the Ministry of
Forests assumes the responsibility of reforestation.
3
One hectare is an area 100 metres square, or 10,000 square metres. Thus,
one hectare is approximately 2.4711 acres.
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minute breaks throughout the day. An average planter can plant about
900 trees per day, about half a hectare. An average harvested tract is
around 250 hectares, so planting such a tract would take about 500 man
days. Because the planting season is short, except to move to a new sites,
planters usually work six days a week with one day o. Moving to a new
site to plant is typically considered time o, and planters are usually not
paid for this time. Days of rest are not endogenous; those planters who
nd the work too arduous generally leave the rm. However, extremely
bad weather is a cause for rest days.
Typically, tree-planting rms are chosen to plant seedlings on har-
vested tracts through a process of competitive bidding. Depending on
the land tenure arrangement, either a timber harvesting rm or the Min-
istry of Forests will call for sealed-bid tenders concerning the cost per tree
planted, with the lowest bidder being selected to perform the work. Typ-
ically, a list of qualied potential bidders is maintained, with new rms
getting on the list by rst soliciting small, relatively unimportant jobs
and being successful on those contracts.
Tree-planting rms are typically quite small, usually having fewer
than one hundred workers. The prevalent way in which planters are
hired is as follows: The principals of the rms hire several foremen. The
principals then usually delegate the task of hiring planters to the foremen.
Foremen are expected to nd suitable planters for the rm. Since foremen
are invariably responsible administratively for their planters, they have
an incentive to nd good ones. Typically, a foreman is responsible for
between ten and fteen planters.
Planters are paid using a variety of schemes. The most common one
is a piece-rate payment scheme. In this case, the planter is paid a specic
amount for each tree planted; e.g., $0.25 per tree. The next most common
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payment scheme is a xed-wage scheme. In this case, the planter is paid a
specic amount for each day worked; e.g., $225 per day. A third payment
scheme, not considered below, involves paying planters by the hectare for
trees planted; e.g., $450 per hectare.
Under all payment schemes, planters are monitored carefully by their
foremen. Foremen are mainly paid according to the output of their teams.
For example, a foreman may get ten percent of his team's gross earnings.
Many foremen also plant in which case they are paid according to the
scheme prevailing for planters, while some foremen also get weekly or
monthly salaries. In some cases, foremen are actually residual claimants,
being paid whatever remains after planters, supplies, penalties, etc. have
been paid.
Individual planters as well as their teams are penalized for poor work.
Penalties can come in a variety of forms. Severe infractions, such as hiding
or \stashing" trees, can result in job loss.
4
For infractions involving
substandard planting, planters can have their pay withheld, and can be
asked to replant the site free of charge. Replanting is a dicult task where
all of the existing planted seedlings must rst be removed before the new
ones can be planted.
The tree-planting season in British Columbia, particularly in the
interior of the province, is very short, typically from early May until early
September, between 16 and 20 weeks. On the coast of the province, if
there is no snow, some planting can occur in March and April. Planters
are hired with the expectation that they will work the entire season. Labor
laws in British Columbia guarantee that planters be given rest every six
4
Planters paid under piece rates will sometimes hide or \stash" seedlings,
usually burying them en masse, claiming later to the foreman that the
seedlings were planted.
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days, although these laws are sometimes ignored, as we shall see in the
data below.
The industry attracts three types of workers: professional planters
who plant each year, students who plant as a summer job while they
attend college, and novices. Some of the novices are also college students,
but other novices will choose planting as their occupation. The bulk of
labor turnover typically occurs within the month of May. Several reasons
for this exist. First, many novices nd the job too arduous, and quit.
Second, some novices are not productive enough. Labor laws in British
Columbia dictate that planters must earn at least the minimum wage.
Some planters do not attain this standard within the rst two pay periods
(four weeks), and are red. Turnover among seasoned planters and those
who make it through May is typically quite low because bonuses (which
can be as much as 10 percent of gross salary) are typically only paid to
those who work the entire planting season.
3. Simple Theoretical Model
In order to get some notion concerning how xed wages and piece rates
can aect the eort decisions of workers, we consider the following simple,
theoretical model: we assume that q(t), output in period t, depends on
a control variable, eort e(t), and a state variable, \fatigue" x(t). One
could think of x(t) as a vector containing a number of measures of fatigue
such as the concentration of lactic acid in the bloodstream, etc., but we
shall treat it as a scalar. Thus,
q(t) = f
 
e(t); x(t)

(3.1)
with f(0; x) being zero; i.e., when no eort is expended, no output
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obtains. Later, we shall assume that the rm can impose a minimum
level of eort e.
Introducing the shorthand notation of f
z
for @f=@z where, in this
case, z can be either e or x, we assume that f
e
is positive, so more
eort increases output, but that f
ee
is non-positive, extra eort has
weakly diminishing marginal productivity. We also assume that f
x
is non-
positive, so increases in fatigue can reduce productivity, and that f
xx
is
non-positive, the eects of fatigue are increasingly negative on output. We
assume no technological progress or learning, so the production function
does not depend explicitly on t.
Under xed wages, workers get a wage w for each period worked.
Thus, y(t), earnings in period t, are simply
y(t) =
n
w when working;
0 at rest.
Under piece rates, workers are paid a price p for each unit of output q(t)
produced, so
y(t) =
n
pq(t) when working;
0 at rest.
We assume that workers gain utility from earnings, but disutility from
eort and fatigue. We assume further a time-separable utility function
over earnings, eort, and fatigue in each period
U
 
y(t); e(t); x(t)

(3.2)
where U
y
is positive, representing the positive marginal utility of earnings,
and U
yy
is non-positive, representing the weakly decreasing marginal
utility of earnings. We also assume that U
e
is negative, representing
the marginal disutility of eort; that U
ee
is non-negative, representing
the increasing marginal disutility of extra eort; that U
x
is non-positive,
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representing the potentially negative eect of fatigue on utility; and that
U
xx
is non-positive, representing the potentially increasingly negative
eect which fatigue has on utility.
Note that by allowing fatigue to enter directly into the production
and utility functions, we are considering a more general class of models
than is typically used. Most researchers (including ourselves in Paarsch
and Shearer [1996]) employ a production function which is independent
(at least directly) of fatigue. In general, fatigue can be interpreted as a
state variable that aects the eciency with which eort is transformed
into output; i.e., a fatigued individual will plant fewer trees per unit of
eort than will a non-fatigued individual. In the more restricted model,
fatigue is interpreted as the cost of eort that enters only the utility
function. Below, we show how panel data on xed-wage planters allows
us to identify and to test for the presence of fatigue eects directly in the
production function.
As a rst approximation, we consider the case where the number of
consecutive days that a planter can work without rest days is xed at
T
1
by either the rm or the government and that the length of the rest
period r is also xed, so the total horizon T
2
equals T
1
plus r. Initially,
we consider the problem of but one spell of work and rest. Later, we
incorporate the complication of repeated spells.
5
Since we consider very short time horizons, discounting is ignored.
5
We assume that T
1
and r are xed either by law or by the rm through
some process of scientic management; see, for example, Smith's (1987)
attempt to use the methodological approach rst proposed by Taylor
(1947) to the case of tree planters.
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Thus, total utility over the time horizon [0; T
2
] is
Z
T
2
0
U
 
y(t); e(t); x(t)

dt =
Z
T
1
0
U
 
y(t); e(t); x(t)

dt+
Z
T
2
T
1
U
 
0; 0; x(t)

dt:
We assume that the equation of motion which describes how fatigue
evolves is a homogeneous rst-order dierential equation, so improved
conditioning (e.g., which implies an improvement in the body's ability to
absorb lactic acid), is ruled out. Thus,
_x(t) =
dx(t)
dt
= g
 
e(t); x(t)

(3.3)
where g
e
is positive, the more eort expended, the faster the build-up of
fatigue, with g
ee
being non-negative, extra eort increases fatigue build-
up faster. We also assume that the eect of extra eort depends on the
level of fatigue; viz., f
ex
is non-negative because eort can increase fatigue
at a faster rate when one is tired than when one is fresh.
In the next two subsections, we describe the optimal choices of a
planter who works one spell of T
1
periods with a rest spell of r periods
under xed wages and piece rates.
3.1. Fixed Wages
Under xed wages, the planter wants to supply the minimum possible
level of eort in each period. Extra eort implies costs without any
benets since his wage is independent of eort. We assume further that
the foreman can and does impose a minimum eort level of e in each
period. In this case, output in each period t on [0; T
1
] conditional on
eort e is
q(tje) = f
 
e; x(t)

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and zero on [T
1
; T
2
], while earnings on [0; T
1
] are
y(t) = w
and zero on [T
1
; T
2
], so total utility over the interval [0; T
2
] is
Z
T
1
0
U
 
w; e; x(tje)

dt+
Z
T
2
T
1
U
 
0; 0; x(tj0)

dt
where x(tje), the path of fatigue conditional on xed eort e, is determined
by the solution to
_x(tje) = g
 
e; x(t)

t 2 [0; T
1
]
with initial condition x(0) equalling x
0
, the value of the state variable for
a fully rested worker, while x(tj0) on [T
1
; T
2
] is the solution to
_x(tj0) = g
 
0; x(t)

t 2 [T
1
; T
2
]
with initial condition x(T
1
) equalling x(T
1
je).
The eect of elapsed work time on output can be determined by
dierentiating the production function conditional on eort e. Hence,
_q(tje) =
dq(tje)
dt
= f
e

de
dt
+ f
x

dx(tje)
dt
= f
e
 (0) + f
x
 _x(tje)
= f
x
 _x(tje):
(3.4)
With fatigue entering the production function, the sign of _q(tje) is inde-
terminate. For while the sign of f
x
is assumed to be negative, the sign
of _x(tje) is indeterminate, depending on e and x
0
as well as the specic
structure of the \fatigue function" g(e; x) not just its partial derivatives.
In Figure 1, we show one possible time path of _q(tje) in which workers
are becoming more fatigued as time progresses.
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Figure 1
Productivity over Time under Fixed Wages
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It is clear how panel data on worker productivity under xed wages
will identify fatigue eects in the production function. Since planters
always supply e, the minimum possible eort level under xed wages,
changes in productivity over time identify the eects of fatigue. Note
that if fatigue does not enter directly into the production function then
(3:4) is equal to zero; no change in productivity occurs over time for xed-
wage planters. In the empirical work below, we will test whether fatigue
enters directly into the production function by measuring the change in
output over time under xed wages.
3.2. Piece Rates
How much eort should a piece-rate planter put forth? The simplest way
to investigate this question is to couch it in terms of an optimal control
problem. The planter seeks a path for eort to maximize total utility
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subject to the constraints imposed by technology. Thus,
max
he(t)i
Z
T
1
0
U

pf
 
e(t); x(t)

; e(t); x(t)

dt+
Z
T
2
T
1
U

0; 0; x(t)

dt:
subject to
e(t)  0
x(t)  x
0
x(0) = x
0
_x = g(e; x):
Introducing the costate variable (t) as well as (t) and  (t), the Kuhn-
Tucker multipliers associated with non-negative eort and the lower
bound on fatigue, the Hamiltonian H for this problem on [0; T
1
] is
H = U

pf
 
e(t); x(t)

; e(t); x(t)

+ (t)g
 
e(t); x(t)

+
(t)e(t) +  (t)
 
x(t)   x
0

whence come the necessary rst-order conditions:
 H
x
=
_
 =  pU
y
f
x
  U
x
  g
x
   
H
e
= 0 = pU
y
f
e
+ U
e
+ g
e
+ 
(t)e(t) = 0
 (t)
 
x(t)   x
0

= 0
x(0) = x
0
(T
2
) = 0:
To simplify the analysis, we make an \Inada-type" assumption con-
cerning the marginal utility of earnings at zero, which means that e(t)
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will be strictly positive, so (t) will equal zero for all t on [0; T
1
]. We also
assume that the dierential equation (3.3) has structure such that x(t)
cannot pass to x
0
(i.e., a fully rested person having x(t) equal x
0
cannot
become any more rested) when eort e(t) is positive, so  (t) equals zero
for all t on [0; T
1
].
Without additional structure, it is still dicult to make any precise
statements concerning the eect of piece rates on eort. In Figure 2, we
present some sample paths for eort and fatique derived for \reasonable"
f(e; x), g(e; x), and U(y; e; x) functions.
6
These translate into sample
paths for output in Figure 3.
3.3. More than One Work-and-Rest Cycle
In previous subsections of this section, we analyzed the case of a single
work-and-rest cycle. In reality, planters are hired for a sequence of these
cycles (as many as twenty). The solution to the xed-wage problem is
not substantially dierent, but that to the piece-rate problem is quite
6
Specically, when the production function is
q(t) = f
 
e(t); x(t)

= e(t)

  x(t);
the utility function is
U
 
y(t); e(t); x(t)

= y(t)  e(t) = pq(t)  e(t) = pe(t)

  px(t)  e(t);
and fatigue is governed by
_x(t) = g
 
e(t); x(t)

= e(t)x(t)  x(t) exp
 
  x(t)

;
no closed-form solution can be obtained for the pair of dierential equa-
tions dening the equilibrium paths of the costate and state variables,
but for explicit values of the parameters, one can solve this two-point,
boundary-value problem using the method of Runge-Kutta; see Judd
(1995) for more on this.
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Figure 2
Eort and Fatigue over the Work Cycle
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Productivity over Time under Piece Rates
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Figure 4
Multiple Spells of Work and Rest
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dierent. Before introducing additional mathematics, we outline here the
intuition behind the solution. Discussion is aided by the use of a diagram,
Figure 4.
There are three \phases" to the repeated work-and-rest problem. The
rst, between 0 and T
2
in Figure 4, is the initial planting cycle. During
this phase, the planter's fatigue rises above the fully-rested state x
0
. In
the second phase, between 2T
2
and 4T
2
(or, in general, between kT
2
and
`T
2
for some integers k and `), the planter is in a \steady-state" with
regard to eort and fatigue.
7
In the nal phase, between 4T
2
and T in
Figure 4, the \big push", the planter recognizes that extra eort has only
implications for this last cycle, and works particularly hard.
8
Depending
7
This is not strictly true as a steady-state would obtain only in the innite
horizon problem.
8
The big push could begin in cycles before the last, but it will be most
16
on the production and fatigue functions, output may rise, fall, or be at,
but both eort and fatigue rise during this last cycle.
Formally, the optimal control problem for (J+1) work sequences and
J rest periods is
max
he(t)i
J
X
j=1
"
Z
jT
2
 r
(j 1)T
2
U

pf
 
e(t); x(t)

; e(t); x(t)

dt+
Z
jT
2
jT
2
 r
U

0; 0; x(t)

dt
#
+
Z
T
JT
2
U

pf
 
e(t); x(t)

; e(t); x(t)

dt+ V
 
x(T )

subject to
e(t)  0
x(t)  x
0
x(0) = x
0
_x = g(e; x)
where V
 
x(T )

represents the planter's valuation of fatigue at the end-
point.
9
Introducing the costate variable (t) as well as (t) and  (t), the
Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with non-negative eort and the lower
bound on fatigue, the HamiltonianH for this problem on [(j 1)T
2
; jT
2
 r]
for j = 1; : : : ; J as well as [JT
2
; T ] is
H = U

pf
 
e(t); x(t)

; e(t); x(t)

+ (t)(g
 
e(t); x(t)

+
(t)e(t) +  (t)
 
x(t)   x
0

pronounced in the last cycle.
9
In this problem, T
1
and r are taken as given, perhaps by law. Another
personnel problem, which is beyond the scope of this paper, involves the
optimal choices of work-spell and rest-period durations.
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whence come the necessary rst-order conditions:
 H
x
=
_
 =  pU
y
f
x
  U
x
  g
x
   
H
e
= 0 = pU
y
f
e
+ U
e
+ g
e
+ 
(t)e(t) = 0
 (t)
 
x(t)   x
0

= 0
x(0) = x
0
(T ) = V
x
 
x(T )

:
As one might expect, comparative dynamic analysis in this problem is
very sensitive to functional forms. Ambiguous predictions are the best
that this structure can provide in the absence of very strong (implausible)
assumptions.
4. Measurement Equation and Empirical Results
The theory discussed in section 3, however simple, is couched in terms
of variables that are notoriously dicult to measure, eort and fatigue.
Thus, implementing a structural model mapping directly from the eco-
nomic theory to an empirical specication is unlikely to be successful. In
addition, only under very strong (implausible) assumptions can one make
very specic comparative dynamic predictions. This is not uncommon in
labor economics. Consider, for example, labor supply, where the slope
of the supply function is, in general, indeterminate. In this section, we
develop a measurement equation that allows us to estimate the reduced-
form dynamic paths of daily productivity for cycles not at the end of the
planting season, under piece-rate and xed-wages contracts.
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A natural way in which to investigate the eects of work and rest
on planter productivity under dierent payment schemes would be to un-
dertake a controlled experiment. Essentially, under each payment scheme
h, one would nd a group of individuals indexed by i, and subject them
to sequences of work indexed by j over a number of work cycles indexed
by k with prior numbers of rest days indexed by ` starting from being
fully rested, and then repeat this a number of times indexed by s. Thus,
introducing the dummy variables for rest
R
`k
is
=
(
1 if individual i for sample s rested
` periods prior to work cycle k,
0 otherwise;
and the dummy variables for working consecutive days
W
jk
is
=
8
>
<
>
:
1 if individual i for sample s is
working the j
th
consecutive day
in work cycle k,
0 otherwise;
one could then write down an empirical specication for the conditional
mean of the logarithm of daily production under payment scheme h for
planter i in sample s who has worked j consecutive days during work cycle
k and has rested ` days prior to this work cycle of the following form:
E[logQ
h
is
jR
`k
is
;W
jk
is
] =
J
h
X
j=1
K
h
X
k=1
!
jk
Whi
W
jk
is
+
K
h
X
k=1
L
h
X
`=1
!
k`
Rhi
R
k`
is
+
J
h
X
j=1
K
h
X
k=1
L
h
X
`=1
!
jk`
RWhi
R
k`
is
W
jk
is
(4.1)
where h takes on the values fF; Pg for xed wages and piece rates, i takes
on the values f1; 2; : : : ; I
h
g, j takes on the values f1; 2; : : : ;J
h
g, k takes
on the values f1; 2; : : : ;K
h
g, ` takes on the values f1; 2; : : : ;L
h
g, and s
takes on the values f1; 2; : : : ;S
h
g.
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In this sepcication, !
jk
Whi
denotes the contribution to the conditional
mean of the logarithm of production under payment scheme h for individ-
ual i for the j
th
consecutive day in work cycle k. The rst term in (4.1)
captures the eect of consecutive days worked on productivity. Note that
we allow this coecient to vary across cycles as well as across individuals.
The second term in (4.1) captures the eect of days rest, prior to the
start of a cycle, on productivity. Again, these eects vary across cycles
and individuals. Finally, the third term captures interactions between the
number of days rested before the start of a cycle and the number of con-
secutive days worked. For example, this allows the eect of an additional
day's rest to aect the second consecutive day worked dierently from the
rst day worked. Cycle-specic eects do not enter into (4.1) because the
coecients on productivity vary across cycles.
In general, the eects of time and rest on productivity are ambiguous
and must be determined empirically. The pattern on the !
Whi
s under
xed wages provides the foundation for a test of whether fatigue enters
directly into the production function. If these coecients are equal, then
a model excluding fatigue from the production function is supported by
the data. However, if these coecients are not equal, then such a model
is rejected by the data. Under piece rates, we have characterized the
eects of days worked and rest on productivity for a particular utility
function and particular parameter values. While these results show a
decreasing time prole of productivity, economic theory does not rule out
contradictory results. Furthermore, while intuition suggests that increases
in rest will increase productivity, these eects may be confounded in
the data, particularly if planters lose tness and sustainable eort levels.
Therefore, we now turn to issues of estimating (4.1).
From the personnel and payroll records of a medium-sized, tree-
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planting rm in the southeastern corner of British Columbia, we have
obtained daily production rates as well as the number of consecutive days
worked and the number of rest days taken between work cycles for 51 indi-
viduals who were involved in a total of 570 dierent work-and-rest cycles,
67 involving xed-wage planters and 503 involving piece-rate planters. In
all, the data set contains 1,928 daily productivity observations, of which
223 concern planters paid xed wages and 1,705 concern planters paid
piece rates.
The construction of the data set is discussed in detail in the appendix
to the paper. Before examining our regression results, we highlight some
important features of the data, discussing some interesting descriptive
statistics concerning our sample. Under xed wages, average work-spell
duration was about 3.7 days, while under piece rates it was 3.4 days. Rest
periods averaged 1.7 days under xed wages and 1.3 days under piece
rates. Under both payment schemes, the proportion of female workers
was about 35 percent. Under xed wages, average daily earnings were
$228.34, while under piece rates they were $226.51. The major dierence
occurred in the number of trees planted: under xed wages, an average of
609 seedlings were planted per day, while under piece rates 939 seedlings
were planted each day. The average price per seedling planted under piece
rates was $0.26.
In Figure 5, one notes that the empirical distributions of work and
rest are relatively similar for the two payment schemes, although under
piece rates there are a few long work spells, one as long as 11 consecutive
days. In Figure 6, on the other hand, one notes that both the distributions
of earnings as well as the distributions of trees planted are quite dierent.
These dierences are also reected in the distributions of the eective
21
price per tree planted depicted in Figure 7.
10
Given these facts, why would a tree-planting rm ever use xed
wages? Firms in the tree-planting industry often vary their payment
system in response to planting conditions in an eort to ensure that
planted trees meet quality standards. The quality of planted trees is
very important since poorly planted trees will not survive, exposing the
rm to nes from the government and a loss of future reputation. When
conditions are poor, thus rendering planting slow, workers who are paid
piece rates may not take the time and eort that is necessary to ensure
their trees are planted well, so xed wages are used. In related work,
Paarsch and Shearer (1996), we develop these ideas formally and apply
them to a subset of the data examined here.
There remains an issue concerning the fact that sites to be planted
are not randomly assigned to one of the two payment schemes, but rather
are often assigned by the rm according to the level of planting diculty.
We assume that heterogeneity among planters is orthogonal to site charac-
teristics.
11
Thus, even though selection is non-random, it is uncorrelated
with the individual-specic or cycle-specic covariates used in the analy-
sis; only estimates of the intercept coecients will be aected. We also
assume that planters are more likely to tire on sites which are dicult to
plant than on easy sites which are easy to plant, even though eort levels
may be dierent across sites. Thus, given xed-wage contracts are paid
10
Eective price is earnings per day divided by number of trees planted.
Under piece rates, this is simply the piece-rate price, but under xed
wages it is the \average" price per tree planted, which we call the \eec-
tive" price per tree planted.
11
Anectdotal evidence gathered from interviews suggests that planter per-
sonal characteristics are not used to select who is paid under the dierent
payment schemes.
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Figure 5
Histograms of Work and Rest Duration
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Figure 6
Histograms of Earnings and Trees Planted
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Figure 7
Histograms of Earnings and Price per Tree Planted
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on sites for which planting is more dicult and planters will tire more
quickly on such ground, the observed prole under piece-rate contracts
will be atter than the one calculated under identical conditions to the
xed-wage contracts. The non-random selection biases the piece-rate pro-
le to be atter and the xed-wage prole to be steeper than they would
be had they been calculated under identical conditions.
Having reviewed some salient descriptive statistics concerning our
data, we would now like to examine the main reduced-form results. Un-
fortunately, a specication like (4.1) is too rich for the data we have at
hand. Thus, we need to impose a number of restrictions on (4.1) to reduce
the number of parameters to be estimated. These restrictions will imply
particular interpretations for the estimated coecients in the resulting
measurement equation.
First, we assume that the interaction eects between rest and days
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worked are zero. Second, we assume the same cycle eects across time
and individuals. Finally, rather than letting all coecients vary with
individuals, we introduce individual-specic dummy variables, so only the
means vary across individuals, not any of the \slope" coecients. The
resulting specication
E[logQ
h
is
jR
`k
is
;W
jk
is
] = !
0hi
+
J
h
X
j=1
!
j
Wh
W
jk
is
+
L
h
X
`=1
!
`
Rh
R
k`
is
(4.2)
still has over one hundred and twenty parameters. We make two other
simplifying assumptions. First, that work eects are linear in consecutive
days worked, so
!
j
Wh
= j!
Wh
j = 1; : : : ;J
h
(4.3)
and second, that the rest eects are linear in the number of days rested,
so
!
`
Rh
= `!
Rh
` = 1; : : : ;L
h
: (4.4)
Letting Q
h
it
denote the number of trees planted by worker i in period
t under payment scheme h, N
h
it
denote the number of consecutive days
worked without a rest day by worker i in period t under payment scheme
h, the basic measurement equation that we use is
logQ
h
it
= 
h
it
+ 
h
N
h
it
+ U
h
it
: (4.5)
Here, we allow 
h
it
to vary with the planter, the cycle being planted, as
well as with the number of days rest taken prior to the current cycle.
We estimated a number of equations like (4.5) separately using data
for xed wages and piece rates. The initial results are presented in the rst
pair of rows of Tables 1 and 2. The estimate for 
P
is  0:0380; average
productivity fell by about 3.8 percent per consecutive day worked. The
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estimate for 
F
, on the other hand, is 0:0126, but the standard error is
so large as to make it insignicantly dierent from zero.
12
In the second
pair of rows of Table 1 and 2, we present results for the specication where
the number of days rest REST prior to the current cycle is included as
a regressor. In the third pair of rows of Table 1 and 2, we present results
for the specication where dummy variables for each planting cycle are
included as regressors. In the nal pair of rows of Table 1 and 2, we present
results for the specication where individual-specic dummy variables for
each planter are included as regressors.
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the results is how stable the
estimates of both 
P
and 
F
are across the dierent specications as well
as the fact that estimates of 
P
are signicantly negative, while those of

F
are small and not signicantly dierent from zero.
When the distributions of the regressors includes outliers, such obser-
vations can be \inuential" in the sense made popular by Belsley, Kuh,
and Welch (1980). To be more precise concerning the notion of inu-
ential, consider the scatterplot of twelve observations in Figure 8. The
observation on the far right of the scatterplot is called a \leverage point"
and it is inuential in the regression analysis because the realization of Y
for this observation will have extra weight by virtue of the fact that it is
far from the point cloud of the regressors on the left. Belsley, Kuh, and
Welch (1980) propose examining the diagonal of the \hat matrix" (more
commonly known as the \projection matrix") which, in the regression
model
Y = X + E
12
Note that the standard errors for all of the estimates derived using the
method of least squares are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity
and were calculated according to the formulae in White (1980).
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Table 1
Regression Results for Piece Rates
Sample Size = 1,705
Variable N REST Cycle Ind. SSR R
2
Estimate  0:038       501:845 0:010
St. Error (0.009)      
Estimate  0:039 0:010     501:177 0:012
St. Error (0.009) (0.005)    
Estimate  0:042 0:004 Included   462:391 0:088
St. Error (0.009) (0.005)  
Estimate  0:040 0:002 Included Included 285:246 0:412
St. Error (0.008) (0.005)
Table 2
Regression Results for Fixed Wages
Sample Size = 223
Variable N REST Cycle Ind. SSR R
2
Estimate 0:013       54:984 0:002
St. Error (0.024)      
Estimate  0:006 0:059     53:852 0:002
St. Error (0.026) (0.022)    
Estimate 0:003 0:062 Included   50:499 0:083
St. Error (0.025) (0.023)  
Estimate 0:004 0:047 Included Included 29:630 0:462
St. Error (0.018) (0.027)
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Figure 8
Example of a Leverage Point
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where Y is a (T  1) vector, X is a (T  k) matrix,  is a (k 1) vector,
and E is a (T  1) vector, is the diagonal of
H = X(X
>
X)
 1
X
>
to nd inuential observations. Now, the average of the diagonal values
of H should be (k=T ) because the trace of H, the sum of its diagonal
elements, is k, sinceH is symmetric and idempotent, having k eigenvalues
equal to one and (T  k) eigenvalues equal to zero. In Figure 8, this would
mean an average of (2=12) or 0:1667. The value for the diagonal of H
corresponding to the leverage point in this example is 0:7864. Note that
the dashed line with the smaller slope illustrates how much eect the
leverage observation has on the regression line. The other dashed line is
the regression line excluding the leverage point.
Since the regressors contain outliers in the variable consecutive days
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worked N , especially under piece rates where there are three observations
with either ten or eleven consecutive days worked, we were concerned that
a few outliers could be driving the results. We calculated the diagonal of
the hat matrix for the most general specication in Tables 1 and 2. We
then sorted the variable N and plotted it along with the corresponding
values for the diagonal of H to see if large values of N , especially under
piece rates, were associated with large values of the diagonal of H, but
this did not turn out to be the case.
There are always concerns that regression results are sensitive to
outliers or contaminated data in the regressand. This is because the
breakdown point of the least squares estimator is (1=T ). The notion of
breakdown point is as follows: consider estimating the population mean of
a normal distribution using the sample mean from T observations. Now
suppose that some observations are mis-measured or contaminated. Sup-
pose that these observations come from the worst realizations imaginable.
What is the least number of contaminated observations that one can have
before the sample mean looses the property that it is a consistent estima-
tor for the population mean? For the sample mean, it is one observation,
or (1=T ) of the sample, so the breakdown point is said to be (1=T ). Now
consider the sample median as an estimator of the population mean of
a normal family in the presence of contaminated observations. In this
case, more than half the sample would have to contaminated before the
estimator would breakdown. For more on breakdown points, see Huber
(1981).
Estimating the coecients (4.5) by the method of least absolute
deviations when U
h
it
is symmetric about zero yields more robust estimates,
those having a breakdown point of one half. In Tables 3 and 4, we present
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Table 3
Least Absolute Deviations Results for Piece Rates
Sample Size = 1,705
Variable N REST Cycle Ind. SSR R
2
Estimate  0:049       518:905 0:010
St. Error (0.007)      
Estimate  0:049 0:003     518:350 0:011
St. Error (0.006) (0.005)    
Estimate  0:044  0:013 Included   473:110 0:080
St. Error (0.006) (0.005)  
Estimate  0:033  0:005 Included Included 298:011 0:428
St. Error (0.005) (0.004)
Table 4
Least Absolute Deviations Results for Fixed Wages
Sample Size = 223
Variable N REST Cycle Ind. SSR R
2
Estimate 0:020       56:556 0:002
St. Error (0.016)      
Estimate  0:004 0:056     54:576 0:002
St. Error (0.013) (0.021)    
Estimate  0:014 0:035 Included   51:113 0:026
St. Error (0.013) (0.022)  
Estimate 0:000 0:038 Included Included 31:812 0:435
St. Error (0.010) (0.019)
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the least absolute deviations estimates.
13
The most notable feature of
these two tables is how similar the entries are to those in Tables 1 and 2.
Note too that the estimated coecients for piece-rate payment schemes
are, in general, systematically smaller (more negative) than the regression
coecients, while for xed-wage payment schemes they are basically zero.
In any case, these estimates suggest that average productivity under
piece rates falls by at least 3 percent and by as much as 5 percent for
each additional consecutive day worked, while average productivity under
xed wages does not vary with consecutive days worked. The fact that
productivity under xed wages is constant throughout the cycle suggests
that a restricted model in which fatigue is not included in the production
function is a reasonable approximation for these data.
To see if the strongly negative and precise results concerning the ef-
fect of N on expected logQ in the case of piece rates are a result of the
proportionality assumption (4.3), we relaxed this assumption by intro-
ducing eleven dummy variables, one for each of the possible cumulative
13
Note that unlike the least squares estimates, the least absolute deviations
estimates need not be unique. This is a common property of quantile es-
timates like the median. Basically, the algorithm used to calculate the
least absolute deviations estimates involves casting the problem in terms
of a linear programming problem and solving it using the simplex algo-
rithm; for more on this, see Barrodale and Roberts (1980). Sometimes
the solution to the linear programme will obtain on the face of the con-
straints, which implies a set of optima yielding a global minimum. Note
that some of the entries in Tables 3 and 4 are non-unique global minima.
Note too that because the optimization problem involves constraints that
are non-dierential at potential optima, alternative forms of analysis are
required to nd the asymptotic distribution of the estimators. For de-
tails concerning the asymptotic properties of the estimators, see Koenker
and Bassett (1978). Note that the standard errors presented in Tables
3 and 4 were calculated assuming that U
h
it
is from the Laplace family of
distributions, the most favorable distribution.
31
Figure 9
Condence Intervals of Work Eect under Piece Rates
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Figure 10
Condence Intervals of Work Eect under Fixed Wages
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days worked. We also introduced a similar set of seven dummy variables
into the xed-wage specication. Given the data available, this structure
permits the most non-linear relationship possible. In Figures 9 and 10, we
present the 95 percent condence intervals for the estimated coecients
on the dummy variables for each cumulated day worked under both piece
rates and xed wages as well as the estimated predicted eects under
the proportionality assumption. The vertical lines at each integer on the
abscissa are the width of the 95 percent condence interval, with the cen-
ter of the interval being the point estimate, while the dotted line is the
predicted value under the proportionality assumption. In both cases, the
restrictions implied by the proportionality assumption are rejected with
p-values less than 0.01, but the important conclusion to glean from this
sort of sensitivity analysis is that, under piece-rate contracts, the esti-
mated coecients on the dummy variables for consecutive days worked
grow more negative with time, while those under xed-wage contracts re-
main close to zero, except for the one associated with seven consecutive
days worked. We note that the leverage point in the data for the xed-
wage specication corresponds to the single observation having N equal
to seven, and an unusually low realization for logQ, some four standard
deviations from the mean. We conjecture that the planter corresponding
to this observation may have not worked a full day.
5. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the intertemporal eects on eort and
productivity when workers are paid either xed wages or piece rates.
For the data concerning tree planters in British Columbia, we nd that
planters paid under piece rates produce more, on average, per day than
those paid xed wages. We also nd that the average daily production
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rate for piece-rate planters falls at a rate between three and ve percent
per day, depending on the model specication and the method of param-
eter estimation, while that for xed-wage planters appears unaected by
the number of consecutive days worked, regardless of the model specica-
tion or the method of parameter estimation. These results highlight the
importance of considering the long-term eects of incentive contracts as
well as the short-term ones.
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A. Appendix
In this appendix, we document the development of the data set used,
describing the sources from which the data were taken as well as the
transformations used in obtaining the nal data set.
The data used in this paper are derived from the personnel records
of a medium-sized tree-planting company located in the southeastern
corner of British Columbia. This rm won contracts throughout British
Columbia.
We keypunched information from copies of the rm's records. For
some days, some of these records were incomplete. In such cases, those
days were eliminated. Reasons for a record being incomplete were worker
sickness or worker leaves the rm. For xed-wage planting, the foremen
sometimes did not count the number of trees that a worker planted. Thus,
the number of xed-wage planting records is under-represented. We do
not believe that this non-reporting is systematic. Specically, we do not
believe that it is related to the number of trees planted, worker eort, or
the worker's personal characteristics.
We have data concerning 51 workers, who were involved in a total of
570 dierent work-and-rest cycles, 67 involving xed-wage planters and
503 involving piece-rate planters. In all, the data set contains 1,928 daily
productivity observations, of which 223 concern planters paid xed wages,
and 1,705 concern planters paid piece rates. Our data set includes the
following variables:
ID : the identication number for the planter.
SEX : a dummy variable indicating the sex of the planter.
WORK : the current day worked of this particular cycle (starting at
0, and then starting again at 0 when the next cycle starts).
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CWP : cumulative days worked, not including the current day, under
a piece rate. If the planter has only used a piece rate, then adding
CWP to WORK will give the total number of days worked.
CP2 : sometimes, a planter takes a long time o between cycles. In-
stead of giving the planter a month of rest, we have restarted the
calculations as if at cycle zero. In general, we did this whenever a
planter went more than ten days between cycles (unless the inter-
vening days were specically entered as days o). Once a planter
starts over, CWP refers to cumulative days worked for a piece rate
for that particular stretch of work. If one adds CP2 and CWP,
then this will give the overall total days worked for a planter. For
example, if a planter had 23 cumulative days worked before taking
a 2 month break, then, when he returned, CWP would start over
from zero, but CP2 would be equal to 23 for all subsequent entries.
Long absences were unusual in this data set, so these distinctions are
relatively unimportant.
CWD : cumulative days worked, not including the current day, under
a day wage.
CD2 : like CP2 , but applies to cumulative days worked under a day
wage regime in previous stretches of work.
CYCLE : the cycle number, starting with 0. A cycle is dened as any
number of consecutive days worked; a new cycle starts when at least
one day of non-work occurs. Note that some planters may seem to be
missing some cycles; e.g., jumps from the third to sixth cycle. This
occurs because some entries were deleted; e.g., no number of trees
entered. If it was known that a person worked, then the relevant
variables were adjusted accordingly.
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CYCLE2 : if a planter was restarted at cycle zero after a long break,
then CYCLE2 refers to the number of cycles worked in the previous
stretch. Adding CUM2 and CYCLE gives the total number of cycles
worked during 1991.
REST : the number of days rested between the end of the last cycle
and this one.
CUMR: cumulative days of rest to this point.
PIECE : the piece rate, if it applies.
DAYRATE : the day rate, if it applies.
TREES : the number of trees planted.
DWAGE : a dummy variable indicating whether a day wage was paid.
PAY : total earnings.
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